Attack tree Discrete-time Bayesian network Gas pipeline a b s t r a c t Security of chemical and oil & gas facilities became a pressing issue after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, due to relevant quantities of hazardous substances that may be present in these sites. Oil & gas pipelines, connecting such facilities, might be potential targets for intentional attacks. The majority of methods addressing pipeline security are mostly qualitative or semi-quantitative, based on expert judgment and thus potentially subjective. In the present study, an innovative security vulnerability assessment methodology is developed, based on Discrete-time Bayesian network (DTBN) technique to investigate the vulnerability of a hazardous facility (pipeline in this study) considering the performance of security countermeasures in place. The methodology is applied to an illustrative gas pipeline in order to rank order the pipeline segments based upon their criticality.
Introduction
Before 9/11 terrorist attacks, risk assessment of chemical plants mostly included safety issues related to accidental events mainly due to human errors, technical failures, natural disasters, etc. (Bajpai and Gupta, 2005) . However, the tragedy of 9/11 demonstrated how unexpected and costly a terrorist attack could be. The risk of terrorism is not limited to the borders of countries and is a worldwide issue that endangers human lives, societies, industries, economies and even the environment worldwide. Therefore, security risk assessment started to be investigated and applied in all sectors including the chemical and process industries. An intentional incident could result in more severe damages compared to an unintentional accident because in the former, and especially in a terrorist attack, an attacker intelligently plans and acts to cause as much losses as possible. Recent terrorist attacks to Iraq's largest refinery in 2015 (AFP, 2015) and to chemical plants in France in June and July 2015 (Scott, 2015) have demonstrated the criticality of security risks in chemical industries.
The security risks of a pipeline may be even more critical than those of fixed plants since pipelines run thousands of kilometres in different areas whose population density, natural surroundings, assets and nearby vulnerable centres might be totally different. Gas pipelines transport highly flammable gases at high pressure on long distances.
A survey on gas pipeline incidents evidences that the most frequent causes of damage are intentional acts (Gas Pipeline Incidents, 2015) .
The flammability of gas can be an attractive property for a terrorist group seeking mass casualties. Additionally, as a great share of the energy supply of the world is gas, a disturbance on gas transporting Table 1 shows a summary of different security risk assessments were discussed. Security risk assessment is a dynamic process and is fully dependent on factors that vary both spatially and temporally. A robust and reliable quantitative tool to carry out a security risk assessment should be able to model such dynamics taking into account new information and data. Moreover, the current quantitative methodologies are mostly developed for fixed plants (Zhang and Reniers, 2016; Khalil, 2016; van Staalduinen et al., 2017) and do not consider the characteristics of transportation systems, and specifically of pipelines.
The present study is aimed at developing a methodology based on Discrete-time BN (DTBN) -a type of dynamic BN -for dynamic security vulnerability assessment of gas pipelines. Due to their flexible structure and capability to consider dependencies, BN has been widely used in safety assessment (Khakzad et al., 2011 (Khakzad et al., , 2013a Yuan et al., 2015) and vulnerability analysis of chemical plants ( Khakzad and Reniers, 2015; Khakzad et al., 2016) . Although security risk assessment can take advantage of BN, to the best knowledge of the authors, the applications of BN to security risk assessment have been very limited. The fundamentals of BN and DTBN and their application to safety and security are briefly explained in Section 2. The methodology is developed in Section 3. In Section 4, the application of the methodology is demonstrated on an illustrative gas pipeline. The paper concludes in Section 5.
2.
Bayesian network
Conventional Bayesian network
A BN (G, P), by definition, is a directed acyclic graph G to factorize a joint probability distribution P that together satisfy the Markov condition (Neapolitan, 2004) . A BN consist of (Jensen and Nilson, 2007):
• A set of variables and a set of directed edges between variables; • Each variable has a finite set of states (except in continuous nodes); • To each variable and its parents, a conditional probability table is attached.
